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Abstract: In [1] it is argued that, in order to confront outstanding problems in cosmol-
ogy and quantum gravity, interpretational aspects of quantum theory can by bypassed
because decoherence is able to resolve them. As a result, [1] concludes that our focus
on conceptual and interpretational issues, while dealing with such matters in [2], is
avoidable and even pernicious. Here we will defend our position by showing in detail
why decoherence does not help in the resolution of foundational questions in quantum
mechanics, such as the measurement problem or the emergence of classicality.
1 Introduction
Since its inception, more than 90 years ago, quantum theory has been a source of
heated debates in relation to interpretational and conceptual matters. The prominent
exchanges between Einstein and Bohr are excellent examples in that regard. An avoid-
ance of such issues is often justified by the enormous success the theory has enjoyed in
applications, ranging from particle physics to condensed matter. However, as people
like John S. Bell showed [3], such a pragmatic attitude is not always acceptable.
In [2] we argue that the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is inadequate
in cosmological contexts because it crucially depends on the existence of observers
external to the studied system (or on an artificial quantum/classical cut). We claim
that if the system in question is the whole universe, such observers are nowhere to be
found, so we conclude that, in order to legitimately apply quantum mechanics in such
contexts, an observer independent interpretation of the theory is required. Nowadays,
there are a number of versions of quantum theory, such as Bohmian mechanics [4] and
objective collapse models [5], with the needed characteristic. In [2] we focus on the
latter to display an array of benefits that such theories offer regarding the resolution of
long-standing problems in cosmology and quantum gravity. In particular, we explore
applications of objective collapse theories to the origin of seeds of cosmic structure, the
problem of time in quantum gravity and the information loss paradox.
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In a recent paper entitled “Less Interpretation and More Decoherence in Quantum
Gravity and Inflationary Cosmology,” E. M. Crull argues that our focus on conceptual
and interpretational issues in [2] is unjustified because quantum decoherence “addresses
precisely those aspects of the measurement problem many believe require resolution
before going onwards, and for resolving new issues within relativistic applications of
the theory” [1, p. 1020]. Crull also maintains that decoherence is all is needed in order
to explain the quantum-to-classical transition and the emergence of classicality. It
seems, then, that it is not that she believes that the issues we raise, regarding, e.g., the
necessity to use an observer independent version of quantum mechanics in cosmological
settings, are not critical, but that she thinks that decoherence is capable of resolving
them.
The objective of this work is twofold. We will defend our position by pointing
out some of the most glaring shortcomings in [1]. However, before doing so, we will
explain in detail why decoherence fails as a tool to resolve foundational questions in
quantum mechanics, such as the measurement problem and the quantum-to-classical
transition. The plan for the manuscript is as follows: in section 2 we will critically
evaluate the relevance of decoherence in foundational discussions, in section 3 we will
directly address the criticism of Crull and in section 4 we will present our conclusions.
2 Decoherence
In recent years, decoherence has become an extremely popular subject, both in applied
and fundamental physics. In the former, decoherence is a subject of enormous rele-
vance, as the effect is one of the main concerns in the practical development of quantum
computers as well as in other interesting experimental proposals. In the latter, it has
often been promoted as the solution to long-standing foundational problems. In par-
ticular, decoherence is deemed to solve (at least important parts of) the measurement
problem and to explain the quantum-to-classical transition. The idea is that decoher-
ence, which is a straightforward consequence of a purely unitary evolution, is able to
effectively explain or bring about the collapse of the wave function, which is, of course,
at the root of the measurement problem. Similarly, decoherence is said to dynamically
single out a preferred basis, which is supposed to coincide with the classical one, thus
explaining the emergence of classicality. The objective of this section is to carefully
show that, contrary to widespread believe, decoherence does not help in the resolution
2
of these foundational questions. The main reason being, as we will see below in detail,
that in order for decoherence to accomplish what it is supposed to, one needs to assume
the very thing that is to be achieved.
Quantum decoherence arises from i) the fact that the inevitable interactions between
a system and its environment typically lead to entanglement between the two and ii)
the fact that the states of the environment entangled with the different states of the
system, usually become, very quickly and to a very good approximation, orthogonal
among themselves. These facts are often described in a more “poetic” language which,
sometimes, is not straightforward to interpret formally. For example, Crull defines
decoherence as follows:
[I]t is a dynamical process whereby a system’s phase relations in particular
bases become decohered or randomized by commuting [sic] with external
(environmental) degrees of freedom.1 [1, p. 1021]
However, it is rather unclear what lies behind the idea that the system’s phase relations
become “decohered or randomized.” Although one might have some intuitive feeling
about things becoming random when they are too complicated, the fact is that the
unitary evolution provided by the Schrödinger equation contains absolutely nothing
random. Moreover, no clear, unambiguous and universally accepted definition of co-
herence (which is supposed to get lost in the process) is available, For example, in [6],
which has lately become the standard reference on the subject, a state is said to be
in a coherent superposition when each of the component states |ψn〉 is simultaneously
present in the state |Ψ〉 = ∑n cn|ψn〉. It is hard to see what the adjective of “coherent”
adds to the standard notion of a superposition and what is the part that gets lost
through the purely unitary interaction at play. It could be that what is really meant
is that when the state of a composite systems is entangled, then each component does
not possess a well-defined state. However, if that is all there is to the loss of coherence,
then one must conclude that any entangled system, such as an EPR pair, is not coher-
ent. In fact, below we will describe in detail what is (probably) meant by the language
in the quote above. All we want to point out here is that such expressions are often
repeated without an adequate understanding of the fact that they are only figures of
speech to be unpacked in formal terms, and that such unpacking is much more subtle
and complex than is usually thought.
1Probably she meant to say “coupling” instead of “commuting”.
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This way of talking about decoherence is even more pervasive, and more confusing,
when the consequences of the process are discussed. For example, [6, p. 5] states:
[T]he coupling to the environment now defines the observable physical prop-
erties of the system. At the same time, quantum coherence, a measure for
the “quantumness” of the system, is delocalized into the entangled sys-
tem–environment state, which effectively removes it from our observation.
in the classic [7, p. 5] Zurek writes:
[S]ystems usually regarded as classical suffer (or benefit) from the natural
loss of quantum coherence, which “leaks out” into the environment... The
resulting “decoherence” cannot be ignored when one addresses the prob-
lem of the reduction of the quantum mechanical wave packet: Decoherence
imposes, in effect, the required “embargo” on the potential outcomes by
allowing the observer to maintain records of alternatives but to be aware of
only one of the branches – one of the “decoherent histories” in the nomen-
clature of Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle...
and Crull gives us:
Decoherence of a system will suppress to extraordinary degree interference
terms in the decohered basis, such that further interactions will practically
always “see” the system in an eigenstate of the basis or bases most af-
fected by decoherence (that is, with respect to system degrees of freedom
that commute most rapidly and efficiently with environmental degrees of
freedom). [1, p. 1021]
We believe that all these words in quotations only obscure the meaning of these phrases
and, more importantly, complicate a conceptual appraisal of their validity. The point,
as we said above, is that one must not forget that these expressions are only figures of
speech and that, in order to fully evaluate them, they have to be unpacked in formal
terms. The problem, as we will see below in detail, is that, in doing so, one finds that
decoherence in fact does not accomplish what it is supposed to.
In order to start such unpacking, we note that decoherence is supposed to solve the
measurement problem and to explain the emergence of classicality by accomplishing
two things (see [6, p. 6]):
1. Suppression of macroscopic interference.
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2. Selection of a preferred basis.
In words of Zurek:
Decoherence destroys superpositions. The environment induces, in effect,
a superselection rule that prevents certain superpositions from being ob-
served. Only states that survive this process can become classical. [7, p.
21]
Therefore, in order to evaluate the ability of decoherence to solve foundational issues,
one must check if decoherence accomplishes these two facts. Below we will show in
detail why decoherence in fact does not explain the suppression of macroscopic in-
terference nor selects a preferred basis. Therefore, decoherence is unable to solve the
measurement problem and to explain the emergence of classicality. In order to fully
back up these claims (sections 2.3 and 2.4 below), we will start with some necessary
preliminary material.
2.1 The standard formalism and the measurement problem
In order to properly discuss the merits of decoherence as a tool to solve foundational
problems in quantum mechanics, it is very useful to start by considering first the
standard interpretation and, in particular, by being explicit about what it consists
of. The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, for which we mean something
along the lines of the version of Dirac [8], von Neumann [9] or what one usually finds
in contemporary textbooks, can be summarized as follows:
• The physical states of quantum systems are represented, at all times, by unit
vectors in an appropriate Hilbert space.
• The physical properties of the system are represented by Hermitian operators.
• The time evolution of the system is governed by the, fully deterministic, Schrödinger
equation.
• The connexion between the mathematical formalism and predictions is given by
the Born rule, which allows one to compute the possible results for any experi-
ment, along with the probabilities associated with each possible result.
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• Finally, there is the projection or collapse postulate that states that, after a
measurement, the state of the system instantaneously jumps to the eigenstate of
the measured property with the eigenvalue corresponding to the measured value.
As it is well known, if the state of the system, before a measurement, is an eigenstate
of what is going to be measured, then Born’s rule predicts that, with certainty, the
result will be the associated eigenvalue. From this, together with some type of a realist
criterion, along the lines of the famous EPR sufficient condition for an element of
reality [10], one can conclude what is usually called the Eigenvector-Eigenvalue (EE)
rule, which states:
• A state possesses the value λ of a property represented by operator the O if and
only if that state is an eigenvector of O with eigenvalue λ.
At any rate, what is clear is that, within the standard interpretation, the only
way to connect the mathematical representations (i.e., vectors and operators) with
predictions, is trough the Born rule (and possibly through the EE rule as well). That
is, the only way to extract a claim regarding what to expect with respect to the physical
properties of a quantum system, from the fact that its quantum state is such and such,
is via the Born rule (an possibly the EE rule as well). In this regard, the Born and
EE rules play the role of physical interpretations of the mathematical formalism of
standard quantum mechanics. That is, they constitute the dictionary that translates
between the math and the world that the physics tries to describe.
But what happens if one decides to drop the Born rule and the collapse postulate, as
is proposed, e.g., within the decoherence program in order to deal with the conceptual
difficulties of quantum theory? Then one must necessarily substitute this interpretation
of the mathematics of the formalism for something else. If one does not do that, then
we do not have, properly speaking, a physical theory. That is, the link between the
formalism and physical predictions is lost. Moreover, by considering a purely unitary
formalism, i.e., by dropping the collapse postulate (and, with it, the Born rule), one
must be very careful not to unwittingly, and of course invalidly, use the standard
interpretation of the formalism in terms of collapses and probabilities. We will see
below that much of the confusion regarding the reach of decoherence as a tool to
resolve foundational questions arises from ignoring these aspects and making this type
of mistakes.
The formalism described above is, of course, the most successful empirical theory
ever constructed. The problem, however, is that, in spite of such an amazing predic-
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tive success, the formalism is not fully satisfactory – the culprit being the notorious
measurement problem. But what is the measurement problem? Crull is right in point-
ing out that the measurement problem means different things to different people and
that, in fact, it sometimes consists of a group of interrelated issues and not only one
specific problem. She is also right in pointing out that there is a lot of confusion in
the literature regarding its true nature, import and consequences. Unfortunately, we
believe that the discussion of the problem in [1] only deepens the misunderstanding.
The measurement problem is, of course, a problem of a theoretical framework.
Therefore, in order to state the problem clearly, it is crucial to first specify in detail the
theoretical framework in question. However, given the proliferation of views regarding
quantum mechanics, it is no wonder that there exists an accompanying proliferation
of ways to state the problem. And given that many of these different ways to present
the quantum formalism are not always compatible among themselves, it is, again, no
wonder that the many different ways to present the measurement problem are also not
compatible among themselves. For example, in terms of the standard interpretation
discussed above, the problem manifests as the fact that the formalism crucially depends
on the notion of measurement, but that such notion is never precisely defined within
the theory.2 The result is a formalism that, under some circumstances, is vague. To
other characterizations of quantum mechanics correspond different formulations of the
measurement problem: in Bohr’s formulation, the problem manifests as an ambiguity
regarding where the classical-quantum cut should be drawn, and, in a theory with
purely unitary evolution (like the one considered within the decoherence program) it
manifests as a mismatch between experience and some predictions of the theory (e.g.,
Schrödinger cat states).
Among all the formulations of the measurement problem present in the literature,
Crull decides to use the one in [6]. According to Schlosshauer’s book, the measurement
problem is composed of three distinct parts:
1. The problem of the preferred basis. What singles out the preferred physical quan-
tities in nature – e.g., why are physical systems usually observed to be in definite
2In section 2.1 of [1] Crull briefly discusses the role measurements play in quantum mechanics,
but by doing so she only contributes to a long tradition of fallacious statements regarding the issue.
To start off, she claims that entanglement arises even in the absence of interaction, which is simply
wrong. Then she tries to define a measurement entity as something capable of gaining information
about some system, such that the information can later be gathered. Such definition is, of course, so
vague that it is practically useless. Moreover, it is circular because in order to gather such information
at a later time one, presumably, needs to somehow measure it!
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positions rather than in superpositions of positions?
2. The problem of the nonobservability of interference. Why is it so difficult to
observe quantum interference effects, especially on macroscopic scales?
3. The problem of outcomes. Why do measurements have outcomes at all, and
what selects a particular outcome among the different possibilities described by
the quantum probability distribution?
Schlosshauer argues that decoherence resolves the first two components and the first
part of the third one (i.e., why measurements have outcomes at all). He also claims
that it is debatable whether it solves the last bit of the third one since it is linked to the
choice of interpretation. In any case, he claims that this last element of the problem is
only of “philosophical” relevance and not important for practical purposes.
At any rate, given our previous discussion regarding the nature of the measurement
problem, it is clear that this formulation of the problem is defective. That is because it
does not, in any way, identify the precise problem it wants to display within a detailed
and specific theoretical framework. Instead, particularly in parts 1 and 2, it simply
states some empirical facts. It is clear that, what Schlosshauer actually has in mind, is a
formalism with a purely unitary evolution in which, as we said above, the measurement
problem manifests as a mismatch between experience and some predictions of the
theory. However, by not being explicit about this in his presentation, he obscures some
of the crucial issues regarding the conceptual analysis needed to evaluate his claims.
In particular, by not stating precisely what is the concrete quantum formalism he
endorses, he allows for some “wiggle room” at the moment of physically interpreting
the formal results obtained by decoherence.
Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, we will be explicit about the quantum formal-
ism in play. It consists of the first three elements of the standard formalism described
above. That is: physical states are represented by vectors, properties by Hermitian
operators and states always evolve according to the Schrödinger equation. Note, that
by dropping the collapse postulate and the Born rule, as we explained above, one
looses the standard physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism (this will
play a crucial role later on when we evaluate the ability of decoherence to solve the
measurement problem).
With this quantum formalism in place, it is easy to show the discrepancy between
its predictions and experience. In this regards, Zurek in [7, p. 4] states:
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[A]t the root of our unease with quantum theory is the clash between the
principle of superposition – the basic tenet of the theory reflected in the
linearity of [the Schrödinger Equation] – and everyday classical reality in
which this principle appears to be violated.
More formally, consider a quantum system S with Hilbert space H and consider an
observable A with eigenvectors {|ai〉S}. Consider also a measuring device M , with
ready state |r〉M , which interacts with the system in the following way
|ai〉S|r〉M Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ |ai〉S|ai〉M (1)
for all i, where |ai〉M is the (macroscopic) state of M which indicates that the result of
the measurement is ai. That is, M is a good measuring device. Then, by the linearity
of the Schrödinger equation, it is clear that(∑
i
ci|ai〉S
)
|r〉M Schrödinger−−−−−−−→
∑
i
ci|ai〉S|ai〉M . (2)
Therefore, the prediction of the theory is that the final state of the measurement is a
superposition of different (macroscopic) states for M , which is not what we observe in
the lab. Note however that Schlosshauer’s way of stating the measurement problem,
i.e., the particular list of facts he chooses regarding the incompatibility between theory
and experience, is suspiciously convenient for decoherence in light of what it is supposed
to achieve (i.e., suppression of macroscopic interference and selection of a preferred
basis). That is, from among all the discrepancies between a purely unitary formalism
and experience, he chooses to highlight precisely those that exactly correspond to what
he believes decoherence explains. For example, he highlights the absence of macroscopic
interference but it is more than an absence of interference that is observed but not
predicted. In fact, in order to claim that interference does not occur we would need to
perform the appropriate experiments, but the discrepancy between experience and the
predictions of a purely unitary quantum theory is there even if we do not perform such
experiments. What we actually see is the absence of superpositions of M in certain
bases.
Below we will evaluate in detail the decoherence process and its alleged ability to
solve foundational questions. However, before doing so, it is important to say a few
words regarding the usage of density matrices within quantum theory.
9
2.2 Density matrices
A density matrix is an operator that encodes information about a quantum mechanical
system. However, density matrices are used for different purposes and, in different situ-
ations, they contain different amounts and kinds of information regarding the quantum
mechanical system (or systems) in question (see e.g., [6, 11]).
To begin with, we point out that, according to the standard interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, all closed or isolated quantum systems possess, at all times, well-defined
quantum states. These states are refereed to as pure and are usually represented by
vectors on an appropriate Hilbert space. However, as is well known, pure states can
also be represented by density matrices. In particular, if the pure state of a system is
given by |ψ〉, then one can define its associated density matrix by ρp = |ψ〉〈ψ|, which
satisfies ρ2p = ρp and Tr(ρp) = 1.3 It is clear that, in this pure state case, the density
matrix ρp contains exactly the same information that the original state vector |ψ〉. In
fact given a density matrix satisfying ρ2p = ρp and Tr(ρp) = 1, one can recover the cor-
responding unity norm vector of the Hilbert space (up to an irrelevant complex phase).
Moreover, it is easy to show that one can use ρp to compute expectation values via
〈O〉 = Tr(ρpO). Note that this identification of the (mathematical notion) trace with
the (physical concept) expectation value is legitimate only if one assumes the Born rule
and the collapse postulate. That is, such mathematical object can be interpreted in
terms of an expectation value, i.e., in terms of what one expects the average of a large
number of measurements on an ensemble of identically prepared systems to be, only if
one assumes that during each measurement, one finds as a result one of the eigenvalues
of O, with probabilities given by the Born rule. This clarifications might seem trivial at
this point but will be crucial latter when we evaluate the claims regarding the alleged
achievements of decoherence.
Density matrices can also be used to describe ensembles of identical systems in which
not all members of the ensemble are prepared in the same state. Instead, the states
of the different members are distributed among a set of states {|χi〉}, with respective
frequencies pi. To such situation, one assigns the density matrix ρm =
∑
i pi|χi〉〈χi|,
which satisfies Tr(ρm) = 1. It is clear that, in the {|χi〉} basis, the constructed matrix
is diagonal, with diagonal elements given by the frequencies pi. The motivation behind
this definition for the density matrix comes from the fact that, in terms of ρm, the
3For any operator A, its trace is defined by Tr(A) =
∑
i〈φi|A|φi〉 with {φi} any basis of the Hilbert
space in question.
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expectation values can, again, be calculated via 〈O〉 = Tr(ρmO). Note however that, in
this case, the calculation of the expectation value depends on two types of probabilities:
the quantum ones, as in the previous case, but also on the classical or epistemic ones,
associated with a lack of knowledge of the exact state of any individual member of
the ensemble. Therefore, in this case, the density matrix contains only statistical
information regarding the possible state of any particular member. A closely related
application of density matrices involves the description of situations in which one wants
to study a closed quantum system, but one does not have full information regarding its
pure state and only knows that the state is one of the members of {|χi〉} with respective
probabilities pi. In such case, one again assigns the density matrix ρm =
∑
i pi|χi〉〈χi|
and calculates expectation values via 〈O〉 = Tr(ρmO). Both of these cases are usually
refereed to as mixed states or proper mixtures.
Before moving on, it is important to point out an ambiguity regarding mixed states.
The problem is that, sometimes, different mixed states are assigned the same density
matrix. As a result, if one is given a density matrix of a mixed state, one does not
automatically know which are the possible states for the system(s) described. To
illustrate the point, consider two ensembles of electrons, one with half of the electrons
with spin-up and half with spin-down along z and the other with half with spin-up and
half with spin-down along y. Given that
1
2 {|+〉z〈+|z + |−〉z〈−|z} =
1
2 {|+〉y〈+|y + |−〉y〈−|y} , (3)
it is clear that both ensembles, which clearly correspond to different physical situations,
will be associated with the same density matrix.
Finally, there is the application of density matrices for the description of a sub-
system of a (closed or isolated) quantum system. Suppose, then, that a system S is
composed of two subsystems A and B. Of course, in general, the partition of S into
subsystems A and B is arbitrary. Now, given that S is an isolated quantum system,
it invariably possesses a well-defined quantum state. However, if such state is an en-
tangled state between A and B, it is impossible to assign well-defined states to such
subsystems. That is, the quantum formalism entails that, in such situations, the sub-
systems simply do not possess well-defined states. There is, however, a way to encode
some of the information regarding a subsystem in a density matrix. In order to do so,
one first constructs the pure density matrix associated with the whole system S and
then takes the partial trace of such matrix over the rest of the system. That is, if |Ψ〉 is
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the state of S, one defines ρA = TrB(ρ) with ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. If, on one hand, the state of
S is separable, the subsystem A possesses a pure state and ρA is just the corresponding
pure density matrix. If, on the other hand, the state of S is entangled, A does not
possess a well-defined state so ρA cannot represent its state. Now, if one considers ob-
servables of S of the form Os = OA⊗ I, then it is easy to show that 〈Os〉 = Tr(ρAOA).
Therefore, as we said above, ρA does not contain any information regarding the actual
physical state of the subsystem in question – such subsystem simply does not possess
one. Instead, it contains information regarding expectation values of measurements
that could be performed on such a subsystem. Density matrices of this type are called
reduced density matrices or improper mixtures, and satisfy Tr(ρA) = 1.
At this point we would like to make a few comments that are crucial in order to
evaluate the claims regarding the capacity of decoherence to solve foundational prob-
lems. These comments have to do with similarities and differences regarding mixed
states and reduced density matrices. Regarding similarities, it is clear that, mathe-
matically speaking, they are identical. That is, they are both generically represented
by matrices with trace equal to one. As a result, entangled subsystems and ensembles
are often described with matrices of identical form. Regarding differences, it is central
to keep in mind that the physical situations described by mixtures (or proper mix-
tures) and reduced density matrices (or improper mixtures) are extremely different. In
the first case, the systems described always possess well-defined quantum states, even
though these might not be known to us. In the second case, if the subsystem one wants
to describe is entangled, it simply does not possess a well-defined state. As a result,
ρA cannot be considered to represent the state of the system, so it becomes merely a
mathematical tool to encode information regarding the behavior of A in measurement
situations. That is, it is only an instrument useful to make predictions regarding the
results one expects to find while performing measurements on the system in question,
assuming, of course, both the Born rule and the projection postulate.
Now we are in position to evaluate if, as advertised, decoherence is in deed able to
suppress macroscopic interference and choose a preferred basis. We will discuss each
of these in turn.
2.3 Suppression of interference
The starting point of the claim that decoherence explains the absence of macroscopic
interference, is the fact that every object inevitably interacts with its environment and,
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furthermore, that through such interaction the environment “obtains certain informa-
tion” regarding the system. Moreover, it is claimed that the states of the environment
that correspond to different states of the system are almost orthogonal. The environ-
ment, then, is said to “continually measure” the system and it is stressed that such
“measurement” does not require a human observer of any sort.
Now let us see how all this works more formally. Suppose we have a quantum
system whose initial state is some superposition 1√2 (|ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉) and we let it interact
with its environment, with initial state |E0〉. As a result of what we said above, the
evolution will look as follows
1√
2
(|ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉) |E0〉 Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ 1√2 (|ψ1〉|E1〉+ |ψ2〉|E2〉) , (4)
with 〈E1|E2〉 ≈ 0. Next it is argued that, since we are interested in the system, and
not the environment, we can trace over the degrees of freedom of the environment
and construct a reduced density matrix for the system, ρS, which contains a complete
description of its measurement statistics. The result is
ρS =
1
2 {|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ |ψ2〉〈ψ2|+ |ψ1〉〈ψ2|〈E2|E1〉+ |ψ2〉〈ψ1|〈E1|E2〉}
≈ 12 {|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ |ψ2〉〈ψ2|} . (5)
What we obtain, then, is a reduced density matrix, formally identical to that of a
mixed state in which the system in question is in either the state |ψ1〉 or the state |ψ2〉,
each with probability of 1/2. Does this mean that this is then the case for the system
we are considering? That is, that the system in question is suddenly, no longer in the
state on the LHS of Eq. (4), in which the system does not even have a well-defined
state, but instead, the system is, definitely, either on the state |ψ1〉 or on the state
|ψ2〉? Of course not. As we explained before, the fact that a reduced density matrix
an a mixed state can have the same form does not mean that they represent the same
physical situations and, in this case, it is crystal clear that they do not. The mere
fact of deciding to ignore the degrees of freedom of the environment of course cannot
have any physical impact on the state of the system. At any rate, the claim defended
by decoherence enthusiasts is often more sophisticated than what we have discussing
so far. The claim they maintain is not that, under the circumstances we have been
discussing, the system is on either |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉, but that, for all practical purposes, it
will behave as if it where. Let us spell out the argument.
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The state of the system is of course given by the LHS of Eq. (4). However, it is
noted that only measurements that include both the system and the environment will
be able to corroborate it and that, in practice, it is impossible to keep track of all
of the environmental degrees of freedom. As a result, it is argued that ρS is, for all
practical purposes the tool to use in order to make predictions regarding all possible
measurements to be carried out on the system. And since ρS is identical to a mixed
state, the results of all these possible measurements are going to be identical to those
of measurements performed on a mixed state. That is, for all practical purposes the
system will behave as a mixture. Decoherence, then, is said to lead to effectively non-
unitary dynamics for the system, which explains the absence of interference between
the components of the superposition. In this regards, Zurek writes:
The key advantage of [a diagonal reduced density matrix] is that its coeffi-
cients may be interpreted as classical probabilities. The [reduced] density
matrix... can be used to describe the alternative states of a composite spin-
detector system that has classical correlations. Von Neuman’s process 1
serves a similar purpose to Bohr’s “border” even though process 1 leaves
all the alternatives in place. When the off-diagonal terms are absent, one
can nevertheless safely maintain that the apparatus, as well as the system,
is each separately in a definite but unknown state, and that the correla-
tion between them still exists in the preferred basis defined by the states
appearing on the diagonal. [7, p. 8]
All this sounds very attractive, the problem is that the above argument is fallacious.
In order to understand why, we need to remember a couple of things. First, that
the quantum formalism at play in decoherence is purely unitary. Therefore, in order
to make empirical predictions, it cannot make use of the standard interpretation of
the mathematical apparatus in terms of the probabilities dictated by the Born rule.
Second, that the possibility to interpret a reduced density matrix as a tool to make
predictions, i.e., the possibility to read its entries as probabilities, crucially depends on
assuming the Born rule. Therefore, the interpretation of the reduced density matrix
needed for decoherence to work as claimed is not available to decoherence. That
is, in order for decoherence alone to solve the measurement problem, it would need
to presuppose exactly what it is trying to explain. In fact, within a purely unitary
formalism, such as the one considered by decoherence, not only one cannot interpret
a reduced density matrix in terms of probabilities but, since no substitution for the
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standard interpretation is given, no predictions can be extracted at all. We conclude
that, contrary to widespread believe, decoherence by itself is not able to explain the
absence of macroscopic interference nor, as a result, to solve the measurement problem.
2.3.1 A simple example
If one takes seriously the claims regarding the achievements of decoherence, then
Shrödinger’s cat, usually considered a paradoxical situation, is in fact fully and satis-
factorily resolved when one decides to trace over the state of the atomic nucleus whose
decay would trigger the release of poisonous gas. That is because, doing so, leads to
a full decoherence of the density matrix characterizing the poor cat. We, after all,
are only concerned about the cat. According to the program of decoherence, in its
application to foundations, as we are only interested in the cat and not the atom, we
are justified not only in tracing over the atom’s degrees of freedom but in interpreting
the diagonal nature of the reduced density matrix as indicating that, for all practi-
cal purposes, the cat is either dead or alive. However, in order to be consistent, we
must insist that a similar position be taken in all instances where the corresponding
situation arises. That is, we must insist that whenever one obtains a density matrix
that is diagonal as the result of tracing over certain degrees of freedom, one should
be able to adopt the analogous position, i.e., that the system of interest is, for all
practical purposes, in one of the states that are represented in that diagonal. Let us
now test whether this is indeed a tenable position. In order to do that, we will consider
a standard EPR-B type situation.
Assume that a spin-0 particle at rest decays into two identical spin-1/2 particles
in an angular momentum conserving process. Let us call x the axis aligned with the
momenta of the emerging spin-1/2 particles. We characterize the two-particle state
that results from the decay in terms of the z polarization states of the two Hilbert
spaces of the individual particles. As the angular momentum of the two particle state
must vanish, it follows that the state must be
|φ〉 = 1√
2
{
|+〉(1)z |−〉(2)z + |−〉(1)z |+〉(2)z
}
, (6)
and the density matrix for the system is given by ρ = |φ〉〈φ|. Suppose now that we
decide that we are not interested in one of the particles (call it 1), and thus we regard
it as an “environment” for the system of interest (particle 2). We therefore, decide to
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trace over its degrees of freedom to obtain the following reduced density matrix for
particle 2
ρ(2) = Tr1(ρ) =
1
2
{
|+〉(2)z 〈+|(2)z + |−〉(2)z 〈−|(2)z
}
, (7)
which clearly is diagonal. Therefore, what we have is a completely decohered density
matrix so, according to the attitude described above, particle 2 must be considered as
having a definite value, of either +1/2 or −1/2, for its spin along the z axis. However,
it is clear that taking such position in not viable.
We can start by noting that the fact that the state |φ〉 is symmetric with respect to
rotations around the x axis implies that we could have written the density matrix using
instead the y polarization states of the two Hilbert spaces of the individual particles
(see Eq. (3)). That is,
ρ(2) = 12
{
|+〉(2)y 〈+|(2)y + |−〉(2)y 〈−|(2)y
}
, (8)
leading this time to the conclusion that the particle must be considered as having its
spin along the y axis defined to be either +1/2 or −1/2. So which one is it?, does
particle 2 have a well defined value of its spin along z or y? Clearly the approach does
not lead to a coherent position.
Furthermore, given Aspect’s experiments confirming the violation of Bell’s inequal-
ities [12, 13, 14], it follows that one cannot assume that particle 2 has a definite (even
if unknown) value for its spin before a measurement takes place. Clearly, such position
would lead to the problematic conclusions highlighted by Bell [15].
It could be pointed out that in order to verify the violation of Bell’s inequalities,
one needs to compare results from both particles and that, at such point, it is no longer
true that we are ignoring the environment (i.e., particle 1). That is, at such point, the
for all practical purposes clause is violated because it is no longer true that we, in
effect, only have access to part of the system. That may be true but it does not solve
the problem for decoherence. That is because, besides the issue of the basis ambiguity
mentioned above, it is at this point that if one wants to describe particle 2 with a
reduced density matrix, and use it to make predictions regarding what one expects
to see, one need to invoke the Born rule. That is, in order to interpret the diagonal
elements of the reduced density matrix as probabilities, one need to assume that, upon
measurement, one will find the particle on an eigenstate of what one measures, with
probabilities given by Born’s rule.
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2.4 Preferred basis
As we explained before in detail, a standard way to state the measurement problem is
as a mismatch between experience and some predictions of standard unitary quantum
mechanics. More concretely, the problem corresponds to a discrepancy between the
prediction of the widespread presence of macroscopic superpositions and the fact that
observers always end up with determinate measurement results. An alternative way
to present the measurement problem is as the fact that, even though the standard
formulation of quantum mechanics depends crucially on the notion of measurement,
such notion is never formally defined within the theory. Then, in order to apply
the formalism, one needs to know, by means external to quantum mechanics, what
constitutes a measurement, when a measurement is taking place, and what it is that
one is measuring.
From all of the above, an important component of the measurement problem, usu-
ally refereed to as the basis problem, can be isolated. In the first case, it corresponds
to the fact that not only the predictions of the formalism deviate form experience but,
since it treats all bases on an equal footing, it does not even single out a particular
basis in which such determinate results are supposed to occur (this in fact corresponds
to the second point in Schlosshauer’s formulation). For the second formulation of the
measurement problem above, the basis problem presents itself as the inability of stan-
dard quantum mechanics to ascertain in advance, and without information external to
the formalism itself, what it is that is going to be measured in any particular measure-
ment situation. It is clear then that any solution of the measurement problem needs
also to address the basis problem.4
Let us illustrate this with a simple example. Consider a quantum system S (with
a 2D Hilbert space) whose state, in the basis associated to observable A, is given by
the following superposition
|ψ〉S = α|a1〉S + β|a2〉S. (9)
Consider also, again, a measurement apparatus M with ready state given by |r〉M and
4In [1], the basis problem is associated with the following question: “Given the statistical improb-
ability of always observing bases that are classical, why should such preferences for them appear in
nature?” We find the decision to state the problem in terms of a statistical improbability quite curious
since one does not expect the observed basis to be chosen at random.
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which interacts with the system in the following way
|ψ〉S|r〉M = (α|a1〉S + β|a2〉S) |r〉M Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ α|a1〉S|a1〉M + β|a2〉S|a2〉M . (10)
Of course, one can write the state |ψ〉S in the basis of observable B instead
|ψ〉S = γ|b1〉S + δ|b2〉S, (11)
in which case the interaction with the apparatus looks as follows
|ψ〉S|r〉M = (γ|b1〉S + δ|b2〉S) |r〉M Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ γ|b1〉S|b1〉M + δ|b2〉S|b2〉M . (12)
Now consider the following question: if we perform the experiment in the laboratory,
will we observe the final state of the apparatus to be either |a1〉M or |a2〉M or either
|b1〉M or |b2〉M (or neither)? As we explained above, the standard interpretation is
unable to answer such a question unless external information, to the effect that M ac-
tually measures (let’s say) A, is provided. Given that such information is not contained
in the standard fundamental description of the situation (given by the quantum states
described above), we conclude that the standard interpretation does not solve the mea-
surement problem. The purely unitary formalism, at least prima facie, is also not able
to answer because it treats all bases on an equal footing. Decoherence, notwithstand-
ing, is supposed to be able to fix the problem. Let us see how this is supposed to
work.
The idea, as described in [6, p. 73] is the following:
The preferred states of the system emerge dynamically as those states that
are the least sensitive, or the most robust, to the interaction with the en-
vironment, in the sense that they become least entangled with the en-
vironment in the course of the evolution and are thus most immune to
decoherence.
More formally, the preferred states are supposed to be the ones that satisfy
|ψi〉|E0〉 Schrödinger−−−−−−−→ |ψi〉|Ei〉, (13)
with 〈Ei|Ej〉 ≈ 0. The idea, then, is that states that are not altered through the inter-
action with the environment are deemed stable and thus observable. Conversely, states
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that do change are said to decohere rapidly and to become, as a result, unobservable
in practice. The reasoning behind this is that, on the one hand, initial superpositions
in the preferred basis will evolve, as in Eq. (4), to entangled states. As a result, their
reduced density matrices will be diagonal, so such states are going to be observable.
On the other hand, Initial superpositions in other bases will not decohere, in the sense
that their reduced density matrices will not be diagonal. In consequence, such states
are going to be unobservable in practice.
In praise of the proposal, Schlosshauer writes:
The clear merit of the approach of environment-induced superselection to
the preferred-basis problem lies in the fact that the preferred basis is not
chosen in an ad hoc manner so as to simply make our measurement records
determinate or to match our experience of which physical quantities are
usually perceived as determinate (for example, position). Instead the selec-
tion is motivated on physical, observer-free grounds, namely, through the
structure of the system–environment interaction Hamiltonian... The ap-
pearance of classicality is therefore grounded in the structure of the physical
laws governing the system–environment interactions. [6, p. 85]
Still, a couple issues come to mind. The first one is whether the rule given to fix
the preferred basis is really observer-free, as advertised. The answer, of course, is
that it is not because the division of the world into a system and an environment is
totally arbitrary. As a result, different decisions as to how to split a system will lead
to different preferred bases. One could try to argue that our epistemic limitations as
humans determine which degrees of freedom are accessible to us, and thus dictate a
particular way so select the environment. However, that is very different from claiming,
as in the quote above, that the selection of the basis is observer-free.
The second issue is the fact that the offered explanation of why it is that we have
access to one basis, the preferred one, but not others, crucially depends on the alleged
suppression of interference achieved by decoherence as long as the reduced density
matrix in question is diagonal. However, we already saw that such link between diag-
onality and observability is fallacious. As a result, the fact that the density matrix in
one basis is diagonal does not imply that such basis will be special in any empirically
interesting sense. Therefore, even if one concedes the fact that the selection of the ba-
sis is observer-free, one still does not have a satisfactory explanation for the preferred
basis.
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2.5 Is decoherence helpful to foundations?
Summing up, decoherence is supposed to achieve two things: the suppression of macro-
scopic interference and the selection of a preferred basis. With respect to the former,
we have seen that the claim that a decohered system behaves, for all practical pur-
poses, like a classical mixture, is not warranted. The reason being that in order to
show that the decohered system in deed behaves like the mixture, one needs to assume
the Born rule. That is, one need to assume that when one measures, one always finds
as a result an eigenstate of the measured operator. Therefore, in order to show that
one will not find a superposition when one measures, one needs to precisely assume
that one will not find a superposition when one measures, defeating the purpose of the
whole enterprise.
Regarding the selection of a preferred basis, we have seen first that the process
is not as observer-free as advertised because the partition of the world into a system
and an environment is of course arbitrary. Furthermore, we have pointed out that
the argument that allegedly explains why it is that there is a dynamically emergent
preferred basis crucially depends on the ability of decoherence to suppress macroscopic
interference. Given that decoherence fails in such a task, the argument in favor of the
preferred basis crumbles. We conclude, then, that decoherence does not explain the
nonobservability of interference nor the emergence of a preferred basis. As a result, it
also does not solve the measurement problem nor explains the emergence of classicality.
The starting point of Crull’s criticism of our work is the fact that decoherence solves
all the relevant interpretational and conceptual problems we worry about. Then she
argues that, since such problems were the motivation behind our decision to consider
non-standard interpretations, the invocation of a specific interpretation5 becomes not
only unnecessary but burdensome. Here we have shown that decoherence does not
address the pressing foundational issues of quantum mechanics. We trust that such
state of affairs emphatically vindicates the motivations behind our work. In the next
section we will examine in more detail specific criticisms of Crull regarding [2].
5Given that the particular interpretation we consider in [2] is fundamentally indeterministic, we
find it odd for Crull to claim that the urgency to consider a specific interpretation most often arises
from a hesitation to accept that the world is indeterministic.
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3 Response to Crull
Section 4 in [1] opens with some remarks regarding our motivations, described in [2],
for focusing on objective collapse models, as well as with comments about our take on
the measurement problem.6
Then, Crull discusses our application of objective collapse models to the three
problems considered in [2] and she describes what, according to her, decoherence reveals
in each of those situations. Below we will directly address such an analysis, but before
doing so, we will present a quick overview of what we defend in [2].
3.1 “Benefits of Objective Collapse Models for Cosmology and
Quantum Gravity” in a nutshell
As we mentioned above, the notion of measurement plays a central role in the standard
formulation of quantum mechanic; yet, such formalism offers no clear rules to determine
which interactions should count as measurements or which subsystems as observers.
The problem is that the predictions of the theory crucially depend on how this so-
called “Heisenberg’s cut” is implemented. Moreover, when the system to be studied is
the whole universe, the complications deepen because, in such case, there is nothing
outside the system that could play the role of the observer. All this is, in essence, the
measurement problem of quantum theory, the resolution of which has motivated the
development of various alternative versions and modifications of quantum mechanics.
Clearly, in order to apply quantum theory to cosmology, one of these alternatives, one
that is observer-independent, is required.
Nowadays there are several proposals for a quantum formalism not fundamentally
based on the notion of measurement or on that of an observer external to the system
6Apparently, Crull finds our brief review of basic features of objective collapse models in [2], which
she takes to be a definition of such models, unsatisfactory: “one might argue that the way in which
[Okon and Sudarsky] define objective collapse theories introduces as many black boxes as it purports
to explain”. It is unclear what is it that she finds in need of further explanation. Evidently, if one is
looking for a completely viable collapse model compatible with relativistic quantum field theory, one
will not find it in our work, nor elsewhere, since such a theory is still very much under construction.
Therefore, one should not compare it directly with finished proposals, such as “decoherence” or the
“Consistent Histories” approach. That is, one cannot compare directly programs under development,
such as quantum gravity proposals, with well established theories such as general relativity, and
demand the former to be as precisely formulated at this stage as is the latter. On the other hand, one
must recognize the potential of the former to deal with evident shortcomings of the latter (i.e., the
incompatibility of GR with quantum theory). At any rate, the literature on objective collapse models
is of course large and of excellent quality (see e.g., [5] and references therein).
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under consideration. They include (with various degrees of success) Bohmian mechan-
ics, Many-world scenarios and several objective collapse models. In [2] we focused on
the latter in order to highlight their potential for the resolution of some long-standing
problems in cosmology and quantum gravity. Objective collapse theories modify the
dynamical equation of the standard theory, with the addition of stochastic and non-
unitary terms, designed to account, on the basis of a single law, for both the quantum
behavior of micro-systems and the absence of superpositions at the macro-level (with-
out ever having to invoke observers or measurements). Early examples of such theories
include CSL [16] and GRW [17], and recently even fully relativistic versions have been
developed [18, 19].
In [2] we noted the potential of these theories to resolve three important open issues
in cosmology and quantum gravity: the origin of the seeds of cosmic structure, the
problem of time in quantum gravity and the black hole information loss paradox. Below
we briefly describe how objective collapse models are able to help in their resolution.
• The inflationary period of cosmological evolution is supposed to erase all mem-
ory of initial conditions, leading to a completely flat, homogeneous and isotropic
early universe with quantum fields in fully homogeneous and isotropic quantum
states. The seeds of cosmological structure, which bring about the formation
of galaxy clusters, galaxies and stars, and thus represent a departure from such
symmetry, are then supposed to emerge as a result of quantum fluctuations. The
standard account for the formation of such seeds implicitly assumes a transition
from a symmetric quantum state to an essentially classical non-symmetric one.
The problem is that a detailed understanding of the process that leads, in the
absence of observers or measurements, from one to the other, is lacking, rendering
the standard account unsatisfactory (in fact, it is easy to show that the standard
quantum evolution, via Schrödinger equation, cannot account for the breakdown
of the initial symmetry).7 The spontaneous reductions of objective collapse mod-
els, on the other hand, provide an explicit, observer-independent, mechanism
for transitions form symmetric no non-symmetric states to occur. This feature
was used in [21] to address the problem in an inflationary cosmological context.
Moreover, this application might not only account for the origin of the seeds of
7It is worth mentioning that J. Hartle long ago noted the serious difficulties faced in attempting to
apply quantum theory to cosmology, [20]. This lead him and his collaborators to conclude that some
modified version of quantum theory was required. They turned to the Consistent Histories framework,
about which we will say more later.
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cosmic structure, but also may provide, through comparison with CMB data,
with valuable clues for the construction of successful objective collapse models
(see e.g., [22, 23, 24]).
• The so-called problem of time in quantum gravity emerges from the broad dis-
parity between the way the concept of time is used in quantum theory and the
role it plays in general relativity. As a result, at least according to an important
class of theories, the “wave function of the universe” does not seem to depend
on time, rendering time inexistent at a fundamental level. Application of ob-
jective collapse models to quantum gravity, however, may dissolve the problem
by providing objective means to anchor time fundamentally. That is because, in
such theories, time evolution is governed by a modified equation that produces
changes even if the Hamiltonian does not do so in the standard picture.
• The black hole information paradox arises from an apparent conflict between
Hawking’s black hole radiation and the fact that time evolution in quantum me-
chanics is unitary. The problem is that while the former suggests that information
of a system falling into a black hole disappears (because, independently of the ini-
tial state, the final one will be thermal as a result of the Hawking evaporation),
the latter implies that information must be conserved (because such evolution
can be encoded in a unitary matrix which is necessarily invertible). There is,
in fact, an ongoing, prominent debate regarding this paradox (there is not even
agreement on whether the situation truly represents a paradox). The disagree-
ments involve, among others issues, different positions regarding the singularity
inside the black hole (whether it can be seen as destroying, or even encoding,
the missing information) or whether quantum gravity will resolve the singularity
and its effect on the missing information. It is evident, however, that the issue
crucially depends on taking quantum theory to be fully information preserving.
Therefore, if the fundamental quantum theory is taken to involve a degree of
information destruction/creation (as objective collapse models do) the conflict,
at least in principle, disappears. The critical issue, of course, is whether it is
possible to solve the problem not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. We
have proposed that this is indeed achievable by making the degree of departure
from the Schrödinger equation dependent on the local value of the Weyl curvature
(a choice that, moreover, seems to connect nicely with Penrose’s famous “Weyl
curvature hypothesis”). Therefore, by adopting an objective collapse model with
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these characteristics, the paradox seems to simply evaporate.
Inspired by the last point, in [2] we have also put forward a speculative idea con-
necting the spontaneous collapse events of objective collapse theories with black holes.
Perhaps, we thought, the lack of unitarity of such theories is simply a reflection of the
effects of virtual black holes that are created and destroyed in association with quantum
fluctuations of the space-time metric. Maybe, then, ordinary quantum theory is what
remains from the fundamentally time-irreversible and information destroying quantum
world in situations where the effects of virtual black holes can be ignored. Our proposal
seems to match well with the old idea that the laws of black hole mechanics imply a
deep connection between quantum theory, relativity and thermodynamics, as well with
early discussions by Penrose, Hawking and others in this general direction (see e.g.,
[25, 26]). Needless to say, much work is required before this scenario could be regarded
as an acceptable description of nature.
3.2 Crull’s analysis of our work
Finally we will examine what Crull has to say regarding the application of objective
collapse models to the three problems mentioned above and, as she says, what deco-
herence reveals in each of those situations. Of course, much of her analysis depends
on the false premise that decoherence solves the measurement problem, but that is not
the end of her confusion. Below we will expose the many limitations in her evaluation
of our work. We will start with the issue of the seeds of cosmic structure.
3.2.1 The seeds of cosmic structure
To start the discussion regarding the seeds of cosmic structure, Crull does little else
than repeating the standard story of how quantum fluctuations are enough to solve the
problem:
[I]n a fundamentally quantum universe there is no true vacuum, as even
fields in vacuum states undergo quantum fluctuations. It turns out that
these fluctuations, when applied to the inflaton field, are sufficient to give
rise to the variety of structure now observable; hence, quantum fluctuations
are the seeds of cosmic structure. [1, p. 1038]
The first line is enough to recognize her profound confusion. The vacuum state in
standard quantum settings, such as a quantum field on a stationary spacetime (i.e.,
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one with a global time-like Killing filed) is a technical notion defined to be the state
with the lowest possible energy. In non-stationary situations, such as an expanding
universe, there is no well-defined notion of energy, and one has to face the fact that
there are multiple constructions of the quantum field theory, leading to various possible
vacuum states.8 In the cosmological scenario under consideration, the adequate state to
choose is the so-called Bunch-Davies vacuum, which is the state that, in the asymptotic
past, when the expansion rate was negligible, corresponded to the Minkowski vacuum.9
So, technically speaking, in an inflationary quantum universe, the vacuum state is a
well-defined state, which is in fact the state used in computing, within the standard
approach, the so-called power spectrum. The fact we highlight in [2] is that such
state is homogeneous and isotropic. Then, why is it, according to Crull, that in a
fundamentally quantum universe there is no true vacuum? She does not seem to be
referring to the issue of non-stationarity, but to the quantum aspects of the treatment.
The second part of her statement clarifies it for us. She argues that there is no
true vacuum because “the state undergoes quantum fluctuations.” But this is not a
tenable position because it implies, for example, that in the case of a simple harmonic
oscillator there is no ground state because such state involves fluctuations in position
and momentum. In fact, these so-called fluctuations are nothing else but the quantum
uncertainties in the position and momentum operators evaluated on the ground state.
This type of confusions are tied to an imprecise and often colloquial use of the word
fluctuation. The truth is that the notion of a quantum fluctuation is often employed in
conjunction of vague ideas associated with the developmental stages of quantum theory
and is often used to hide poorly understood conceptual issues in modern quantum
theory. For example, the vacuum state in a standard QFT is often said to undergo
quantum fluctuations (see the last quote) and some even imagine these fluctuations as
occurring in time or as statistical fluctuations in some ill defined ensemble. However,
it is clear that the ground state of, say, a harmonic oscillator, even if it has fluctuations
(i.e., uncertainties) in momentum and position, being an energy eigenstate, does not
evolve in time. So which one is it, does it fluctuate in the usual meaning, as something
8Things get further complicated by the fact that these constructions turn out to be inequivalent.
However, a careful analysis using the algebraic approach shows that these problems can be readily
overcome [27].
9Strictly speaking, if the expansion of the universe is not exactly exponential, and the space-time is
therefore not truly described by the de Sitter line element, the state is not the Bunch-Davies vacuum.
However, the important point for our purposes is that in such scenario the vacuum is still homogeneous
and isotropic.
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changing rapidly and stochastically with time, or not? Of course it does not. So one
has to take with a grain of salt any explanation given in terms of quantum fluctuations.
By looking at the often muddled discussions about these issues in some detail,
one sees that the word “fluctuation” is frequently inadvertently used with different
meanings, leading to confusion. In particular, in search for clarity, one must be careful
not to confuse quantum uncertainties with statistical fluctuations. That is, we should
distinguish between the variance of a certain quantity in an ensemble of systems and the
quantum uncertainty of the corresponding quantity in the quantum state describing a
single system. When Crull says “these fluctuations, when applied to the inflaton field,
are sufficient to give rise to the variety of structure now observable; hence, quantum
fluctuations are the seeds of cosmic structure” she is clearly failing to see the difference.
Crull only rehearses the standard account of how quantum fluctuations are supposed to
give rise to the seeds of cosmic structure. However, she just repeats these words without
explaining how the process is supposed to work. That is, she does not, nor anybody else
for that matter, give a precise account of how, with or without “quantum fluctuations”
(which, as we have said, should be better referred to as “quantum uncertainties”), the
symmetry of the initial state could be broken.
At any rate, the key argument against the standard explanation for the emergence
of seeds of cosmic structure, particularly in the context considered by Crull in which
closed quantum systems always evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, is the
following:
i) The initial state for the whole universe is totally homogeneous and isotropic.
ii) The time evolution of such state, given that the universe is a closed system, is
always controlled by a purely unitary dynamics.
iii) Such unitary dynamics preserves the homogeneity and isotropy of the initial state.
iv) As a result, regardless of possible interactions between different parts of the system,
the state of the whole universe, at any time, is necessarily homogeneous and
isotropic.
Therefore, regardless of the image that the words “quantum fluctuations” can bring
to one’s mind, and in spite of the fact that different parts of the system may interact
and get correlated, the standard story (even including decoherence) is incapable of
explaining the emergence of structure out of the initially homogeneous and isotropic
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state. That is, no matter how complicated the internal dynamics may be, the basic
assumptions of the standard story guarantee that the state will always be symmetric.10
Regarding this extremely simple argument, Crull writes:
What is wrong with this conclusion is that it fails to account for inevitable
non-local quantum interactions when assuming that the initially symmetric
state describes a closed system. Even were the system to begin in a pure
state, it would not remain so for long; along comes decoherence, and things
are not what they seem. [1, p. 1039]
First, note her strange use of the notion of “non-local quantum interactions.” All
interactions in standard cosmology are of course local. Presumably what Crull has in
mind are non-local correlations within the state but such correlations, as we explained
above, have nothing to do with the breakdown of the symmetry. It seems, however,
that she realizes that the complicated interactions by themselves cannot account for
the breakdown of the symmetry thus she seeks help in decoherence. The idea seems
to be that somehow, due to decoherence, an initially pure state for the universe as a
whole will soon stop being so. Clearly this is absurd. Even if decoherence explains
why states of subsystems lose purity, this would not apply to the state of the universe
as a whole because there is nothing external to the universe, which could interact and
get entangled with it.
Regardless, Crull then argues that “quantum dynamics alone explains that such
symmetries are not in fact destroyed but only become hidden” and she points out that
“[t]he only measurement required to explain evolution from symmetry to apparent
asymmetry is a (likely arbitrary) interaction with some external degree(s) of freedom”
[1, p. 1039]. We wonder what are supposed to be these degrees of freedom which are
supposed to be external to the universe as a whole. Probably what Crull has in mind is
not external degrees of freedom but internal ones that are ignored because we are not
interested on them or even because we lack the ability to keep track of them (either due
to technical limitations or even for some stronger reasons, e.g., the degrees of freedom
might lie beyond our cosmological horizon). However, such position is untenable; let
us see why.
10The simplicity of the structure of the previous argument can be illustrated with the following
straightforward example: Suppose that we have a classical system, as complicated as you like, but
such that, at t = 0, its total energy is zero. Suppose, moreover, that the Hamiltonian of the system
is time-translation invariant. As a result, the total energy of the system, at any other time, and
independently of the details of the evolution, will also be zero. The same is true of the symmetry of
the Bunch-Davies state under standard evolution.
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According to standard inflationary cosmology, the quantum fluctuations of the in-
flaton field, which break the symmetries of homogeneity and isotropy of the vacuum
state, are the starting point of the evolution of structures of the universe. That is,
after such breakdown, the regions that turn out to have slightly larger densities than
average, due to the attractive nature of the gravitational interaction, are supposed
to become those region where matter accretes, leading eventually to the formation of
galaxies, stars, planets, and eventually, in at least one of those, to the emergence of
life. Life, of course, then is supposed to evolve according to the basic scheme proposed
by Darwin and eventually, in one of the continents of that planet, a particular lineage
of apes, takes an evolutionary path that leads to the development of relatively large
brains and to what we call intelligence. These creatures then create civilizations and
eventually invent science and discover quantum physics. Later, in contemplating their
study of the universe, they, or at least some of them, decide to ignore (which, as far as
we know, is an essentially human action) certain degrees of freedom, or perhaps they
simply find that they are not able to keep tack of them. By doing so, they obtain a
decohered density matrix for the other degrees of freedom. This decoherence, we are
told, is then supposed to be essential for an account of the breakdown of the symmetry
that leads to all that preceded it.
Clearly all this is very strange, to say the least. A human act is supposed to be, at
least in part, the cause for the breakdown of the symmetry that leads to the emergence
of galaxies, planets and, eventually, humans. That is, we are confronted with a clear
case of closed causal explanation, for which the word circularity might be redundant
but for which the word coherence certainly is inapplicable. It should be clear in any
event that what humans decide or not to ignore cannot be part of a fundamental
description of the world.
Crull then goes on to describe the work of Kiefer et al. (see e.g., [28]), where various
other arguments are brought into play. This we can see as an implicit acknowledgment
that what was offered before did not provide a sufficiently good argument. The point
is, however, that a collection, no matter how large, of bad arguments, does not make
up for a good one.
One of these additional arguments relies on squeezing, which arises as a feature of
the evolution of some simple modification of a quantum mechanical harmonic oscilla-
tor. Such modification can be a simple as making the mass dependent on time. The
point is that if the system was prepared in the ground state of the Hamiltonian at
say, t = 0, then at all latter times the system would be in an excited state in which
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the uncertainties of the original canonical variables are much larger. The interesting
aspect of all this is that there exist other canonical variables where the uncertainties
will be again minimal. In any event, the problem is that such modified evolution does
not break the initial symmetry and thus the state, squeezed or not, remains homoge-
neous and isotropic. In order to move forward, Kiefer et. al. rely on an unjustified
interpretation of quantum theory. They claim that, because certain uncertainties are
too large, one can consider the squeezed states as classical. This is not just contrary to
the view taken by experimentalists working in quantum optics, who view these states
as extremely quantum mechanical, but also clearly unwarranted. Moreover, the fact
that the uncertainties are small when using a different set of variables, clearly renders
the position inconsistent.
A related argument, also put forward by Kiefer et. al., claims that, as a result of
the squeezing, certain degrees of freedom become unobservably small and thus should
be traced over. At such point the decoherence story is supposed to take over. However,
it is clear that this would brings us back to a situation in which we explain our own
existence in terms, at least in part, of our own limitations (for an in-depth discussion
of the analysis presented by Keifer et. al. see [29]).
Finally, to put another nail in the coffin of these claims, we note that, in situations
involving symmetries, such as the cosmological under discussion, the decoherence pro-
gram is incapable of providing a preferential basis (i.e., the basis where the decohered
matrix is diagonal). The issue can be seen in the EPR-B example presented in section
2.3.1, where tracing over the spin degrees of freedom of one of the particles leads to a
reduced density matrix for the other that is not only diagonal, but proportional to the
identity. Therefore, it is diagonal in any orthogonal basis. That this situation would
arise in the cosmological setting, follows from the following theorem first presented in
[30]:
Theorem: Consider a quantum system made of a subsystem S and an environment
E, with corresponding Hilbert spaces HS and HE so that the complete system is
described by states in the product Hilbert space HS ⊗ HE. Let G be a symmetry
group acting on the Hilbert space of the full system in a way that does not mix the
system and environment. That is, the unitary representation O of G on HS ⊗ HE is
such that ∀g ∈ G, Oˆ(g) = OˆS(g)⊗ OˆE(g), where OˆS(g) and OˆE(g) act on HS and HE
respectively. Let the system be characterized by a density matrix ρˆ which is invariant
under G. Then the reduced density matrix of the subsystem is a multiple of the identity
in each invariant subspace of HS.
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Regarding the inflationary cosmology setting, this theorem indicates that, when
offering an argument involving decoherence, even if one ignores all other shortcomings,
when the selection of the degrees of freedom that will play the role of environment
are made with any kind of objective criteria, (such as the argument that the modes of
the scalar fields that as a result of inflation have a decreasing amplitude, and should
thus be considered unobservable), the resulting reduced density matrix will not offer
a unique selection of the preferred basis. This is simply because such matrix will be
proportional to the identity in very large subspaces of the full Hilbert space of the
theory.
3.2.2 The problem of time in quantum gravity
Regarding the problem of time in quantum gravity, Crull says the following:
The diffeomorphism invariance of general relativity, when carried into a
quantized theory, results in a quantum state that cannot differentiate be-
tween space-times – i.e., the quantum description fails to pick out a unique
hyper-surface corresponding to our physical universe. [1, p. 1041]
It is hard to decide what to make of the above explanations. For starters, it mixes up
the comparison of different space-times with the comparison of different hyper-surfaces
in one space-time. The actual problem is that, in theories involving gauge symmetries
(i.e., symmetries that are associated with multiple representations of the same physical
situation), the wave function must assign the same value to each representation. This
is the basic conceptual foundation of Dirac’s quantization procedure for such systems.
The problem is that in theories respecting general diffeomorphism invariance, such as
general relativity, the data on any Cauchy hyper-surface is equivalent to the data on
any other one corresponding to the same space-time. Thus, the wave function cannot
depend on the choice of hyper-surface, and this leads to time disappearing from the
theory.
At any rate, commenting on our proposal, Crull states:
[Okon and Sudarsky]’s proposal to resolve the problem of time by simply
introducing nonunitary terms is motivated by the false impression that the
dynamics of the system under consideration is properly unitary – and we
know this is hardly ever true. [1, p. 1041]
and then:
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[C]anonical approaches to quantum gravity have largely only considered
“pure”, matterless gravity fields, taking for granted the pedestrian fact
that any system short of the universe [at] large is in truth interacting and
hence not evolving strictly in accordance with Schrödinger’s equation. [1,
p. 1042]
Apparently, Crull believes that when a system is interacting, it does not evolve in
accordance with Schrödinger’s equation. Perhaps what she is considering is the effective
dynamics for just part of the quantum system. The confusion can be seen as arising
from the belief that decoherence brings about a fundamental breakdown of unitarity,
in contrast with the simple, but rather unhelpful, fact that the effective dynamics for a
part of the system might not be unitary. This of course does not help in the context of
interest because, at the fundamental level, one does not want to leave anything outside
the quantum mechanical treatment since the system in question is the whole universe.
In fact, as bringing gravity under the quantum umbrella would close the program of
providing a quantum treatment of every fundamental degree of freedom in nature,
deciding to leave something outside would be, in principle, unwarranted. Moreover, it
is hard to consider situations where gravity is treated quantum mechanically and other
fields are not.
In sum, while decoherence might explain why subsystems may effectively undergo
non-unitary evolution, it could never imply that closed systems, such as the universe
as a whole, would ever deviate from unitary evolution. We conclude that decoherence
by itself is unable to help with the problem of time in quantum gravity.
3.2.3 The black hole information loss paradox
Regarding the information loss paradox, Crull starts the discussion by acknowledging
that the non-unitary behavior of the objective collapse models does resolve the issue.
However, she argues that the problem can also be solved without having to assume non-
unitary behavior at the fundamental level. In this respect, she states the following:
[O]ne need not forsake unitary evolution, only the assumption of unitary
evolution for systems partaking in Hawking radiation. This is the tactic
described in [[31] and [32] by Gambini et al.]: the physical clocks picked
out by decoherence are used to calculate the rate of information loss in
black hole evaporation. [1, p. 1042]
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Therefore, we are led again to consider a scheme where the underlying evolution is the
standard unitary one, provided by the Schrödinger equation. However, it is argued that
this refers only to a fundamental underlying time to which we have no access. Instead,
we are directed to regard the evolution as described by an empirically accessible time,
associated with a physical clock, the march of which, in terms of the fundamental time,
is again ruled by its own Hamiltonian. The point made in [31] and [32] is that, when
considering the evolution of the rest of the system, relative to the time measured by the
physical clock, one does not recover an exact unitary evolution. This is then consider
as a possible explanation for the apparent breakdown of unitarity in the complete
evaporation of black holes.
Does this provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox? At first sight it might
seem that it does. However, a moment’s consideration reveals the deep flaw in the
argument. Remember that, in terms of the fundamental time, the evolution would still
be fully unitary. Therefore, what has been achieved, is to deviate attention from the
truly fundamental question: where does the fundamental information reside, if in terms
of the fundamental time the black hole eventually evaporates (even if the fundamental
time for this is different from that indicated by the physical clock)? Instead, we have
been led to consider a very different question regarding the description of things in
terms of the physical clock.
As explained in detail in [33], the so-called “Montevideo Interpretation” described
in [31] and [32], in which the measurement problem is to be solved by relying on
the decoherence brought about by the intrinsic limitations of physical clocks, should
be considered in a sort of Everettian scheme, in which the full information is invari-
ably present in the complete state of the quantum system. The point is that when
considering the situation at a time well after the evaporation of the black hole, and
independently of how precisely such time might be specified by real physical clocks, one
cannot see, in any such proposal, where the information is supposed to be preserved,
i.e., what are the degrees of freedom where such information would be encoded.
In other words, the puzzle, when formulated in terms of the fundamental physical
laws, is still present, and it only seems to disappear when we look at things in a
less precise way. This seems to be in fact the general strategy of some advocates of
the decoherence program when used to address the conceptual difficulties of quantum
theory: to replace a deep real problem by a secondary one and to convince us not only
that the latter is solved, but that doing so is equivalent to solving the former. No
wonder that we feel like spectators in a magic show. The problem is that the tactic
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used by the advocates of such an approach is not very different than the one used by
the magician.
4 Conclusions
Attempts to use decoherence by itself to resolve foundational questions in quantum
theory, such as the measurement problem, suffer from the same basic shortcoming
confronted by those who wish to, as they say, “have their cake and eat it too”. These
attempts try to avoid modifications of quantum theory, but at the same time, want to
obtain the benefits that such modifications can bring. In practice, people that adopt
this attitude often end up adapting their interpretation of the theory in a case by
case manner. Then, they try to justify such moves using arguments that rely on a
combination of classical intuition and quantum mechanical elements, borrowed freely
from either the old or the modern versions, without any concern for the fact that some
of those arguments rest on assuming the very aspect they want to address.
On the other hand, even some of the strongest advocates of the decoherence pro-
gram acknowledge that decoherence by itself is hardly enough to solve foundational
problems and realize the need to rely on some extra input (see, e.g., [34]). As a re-
sult, some are driven to look for the missing aspects by complementing decoherence
with interpretational elements from, e.g., Many Worlds [35] or the Consistent Histories
formalism [36, 37]. However, we do not believe that these approaches can at present
be considered satisfactory. Regarding the Consistent Histories approach, we point the
interested reader to the critical works [38, 39, 40]. As for the Many Worlds Interpre-
tation, we can point to section 4 of [41]. At any rate, what is clear is that, without
a clear interpretational framework, one is at a loss not only regarding the exceptional
situations we have dealt with here in some detail, but also with respect to standard
applications of the theory.
We find rather puzzling the relatively widespread willingness to accept analyses
of foundational issues in quantum mechanics, which seem to work when advanced
with an imprecise language, but that clearly fail dramatically when carried out in a
rigorous and detailed manner. One cannot help but recall the impetus behind efforts
to design perpetual motion machines, using complex contraptions of wheels, pulleys
and levers, in the unexplainable and stubborn hope of somehow bypassing the second
law of thermodynamics.
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Perhaps, just as the desire to avoid confronting the inevitability of death predisposes
people to accept rather fantastic stories, which they would not even consider in a
different context, the desperate desire to avoid confronting the difficulties of quantum
theory allows people to be deceived or even to deceive themselves. This is certainly
understandable as a human psychological trait, but as far as the goal to achieve a
deeper and better understanding of nature is concerned, it certainly is an impediment.
On the contrary, what can be of help is a disciplined and unflinching commitment to
maintain coherence in our theoretical and philosophical analyses. Carefully assessing
the extent to which a proposal might work is the only path to advancement in a field
where there are not too many empirical clues. It is far more productive to consider in
detail clear ideas that might be wrong, that to entertain unclear and vague arguments
in ways that might even be self-contradictory. As noted by Sir Francis Bacon when
considering the scientific enterprise in general: “Truth emerges more readily from error
than from confusion.”
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